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Comments and Casenotes
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRIVACY -
"A SIZABLE HUNK OF LIBERTY"
By FRANK R. GOLDSTEIN
They are lonely; the spirit of their writing and conversation
is lonely; they repel influences; they shun general society;
they incline to shut themselves in their chamber in the house,
to live in the country rather than in the town, and to find their
tasks and amusements in solitude. Society, to be sure, does
not take this very well; it saith, Whoso goes to walk alone,
accuses the whole world; he declares all to be unfit to be his
companions; it is very uncivil, nay, insulting; Society will
retaliate.'
"It has been said that each generation gets about as much liberty as
it deserves." 2
PRIVACY IN THE CONSTITUTION
The proposition is simply this: in a system of government attuned
to the freedom and liberty of the individual man, where those rights
not delegated are "retained by the people,"' where one can sing of
himself and elect his leaders, surely, there must be a right "to be let
alone," 4 "to be oneself."' In a government whose powers and functions
are divided, partly for efficiency but mostly as a system of checks and
balances, the rights of the individual must weigh heavily in the scheme
of things. And, unquestionably, in the American system of govern-
ment personal liberties have always received the highest considera-
tion - the Bill of Rights itself epitomizes our early concern for
personal freedoms. When a government tells you what to publish in
your newspaper, we know where to turn; there is a Constitution and
an amendment to that Constitution which in rather certain terms deals
with the problem. Likewise, when a government refuses to allow you
to vote because of your color, we can look to this constitution and
1. EMERSON, The Transcendentalist, in SELECTIONS FROM RALPH WALDO EMER-
SON 198-99 (Whicher ed. 1960).
2. Griswald, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 216, 226 (1960).
3. U.S. CoNST. amend. IX.
4. This phrase was evidently first articulated by Judge Cooley in his work on
torts. See COOLEY, TORTS § 18 (4th ed. 1932).
5. See King, Electronic Surveillance and Constitutional Rights: Some Recent
Developments and Observations, 33 Go. WASH. L. Rxv. 240, 268 (1964) : "This basic
and indivisible liberty may be found under a number of names. It may be termed the
'right to privacy' . . . 'the right to be let alone' . . . the 'right to express oneself secretly'
or 'freedom from surveillance'. In a positive view, it might be said to be 'the right
to be oneself'."
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seek enforcement of a right that is guaranteed. But when that which
is violated is the concept we call privacy, we may, as Professor Redlich
points out, find ourselves "saying, 'The law is unconstitutional - but
why?' "6
The reason why we ask this question is because privacy, as a
viable legal concept, is relatively new. It is true that some right "to
be let alone" was recognized early in the common law,7 but any recog-
nition of the right of the individual to effectively insure this liberty
in America must date to the now-famous article of Warren and
Brandeis in 1890.8 It was in this period of history bordering on the
twentieth century, when sensational journalism in the United States
was first making its mark,9 that the theory of a cause of action for
violation of one's privacy was born. And here is the essence of the
problem: since it is not until the 1890's that the impact of the privacy
concept began to be felt, where, in a constitution drafted a hundred
years earlier, can we look for a protection of that concept?
Nowhere in the Constitution is a general right of privacy men-
tioned, but several facets of the privacy idea were given effect through-
out. The first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments
have all at one time or another been considered by some member of the
Supreme Court as protecting a right of privacy. Thus, to determine
the scope of the Constitution's protection of privacy, we must begin
with those portions of privacy which are in fact enumerated in or trace-
able to a specific provision.
The fourth amendment is the closest thing we have to an express
right of privacy :10 the people shall be secure in their homes and persons
"against unreasonable searches and seizures." In protecting against
unreasonable intrusions, the fourth amendment manifests the drafters'
early awareness of the privacy concept. It is an amendment which has
received significant constitutional interpretation. The basic exclu-
sionary rule which emanated from the fourth amendment - that il-
legally obtained evidence may not be used against the defendant - was
enunciated first in Weeks v. United States" against the federal
government.
Wolf v. Colorado' held that the Weeks exclusionary rule was not
mandatory to the states by the fourteenth amendment. In Mapp v.
Ohio 3 this principle was changed and the Court did extend the fourth
6. Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained By The People"?, 37
N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 787, 798 (1962).
7. See 4 BLACKSTO", COMMtNTAIZS 168 (Lewis ed. 1900): "Eavesdroppers,
or such as listen under walls or windows, or the eaves of a house, to hearken after
discourse . ..are a common nuisance, and presentable at the court-leet . ..or are
indictable at the sessions ... "
8. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rgv. 193 (1890).
9. Dean Pound feels that the advent of sensational journalism was a significant
factor in the development of a privacy concept in 1890. See Pound, The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Right of Privacy, 13 W. Rls. L. Rev. 34, 36 (1961).
10. Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962
Sup. C'. Rv. 212, 215.
11. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
12. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
13. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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amendment's search and seizure protection to the states via the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Not only was this deci-
sion of immense importance in the administration of criminal justice
throughout the nation,' 4 but also it manifested a keener concern by the
Court for the significance of the privacy idea. As the rate of crime
increases, the temptation to abridge or narrow the fourth amendment's
protection becomes more inviting. But the inference from Mapp is that
the Court has responded to the temptation by avoiding it altogether;
the Court has re-interpreted its own stand and, thereby, enlarged the
scope of the fourth amendment principle. However, in Olmstead v.
United States5 it was determined that wiretapping was not a search
and seizure because there was no physical trespass. This physical
trespass test became the one used for determining whether there was
an illegal search and seizure. It is a test subject to much criticism,
the main objection being that it makes the rights of the people turn on
technicalities.' 6
Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated that there are limita-
tions on the scope of the protection to be afforded the right of privacy
as it derives from the fourth amendment. It is not all searches and
seizures that are prohibited, but only unreasonable ones.' Privacy, like
every other basic right, is not absolutely guaranteed. Other interests
must be considered. In the tort for invasion of privacy this idea is
evidenced by the fact that the public has a legitimate right to know
certain facts about certain people, and, if this is one of these facts
and you are one of those people, you will not recover.'" In the constitu-
tional area the case of Frank v. Maryland'9 is a good example of the
balancing process that must be undertaken. In Frank, the Court upheld
a statute2 0 permitting a health inspector without a warrant to demand
admission to a home. The Court, through Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
felt that any right to privacy involved was outweighed by the state's
legitimate interest in the health of the community. The principle being
articulated was clear: privacy is only one concept to be considered, and
14. See Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large In The Fifty States, 1962 Du"
L.J. 319.
15. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
16. Compare Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), where using a
"detectaphone" listening device did not constitute a technical trespass, with Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), where the court found a technical trespass in a
spike microphone. King, supra note 5, at 248-50, finds four basic difficulties with the
physical trespass test: "a 'fraction of an inch' may determine whether . . . rights
have been violated"; it fails to "take into account the technological advances in . . .
electronic surveillance"; it does not look to the basic liberty involved; and it over-
emphasizes the fourth amendment.
In Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962), a new test was suggested: the
constitutionally protected area. The Court said that a visiting room in a jail was not
an area where the fourth amendment rights were protected. This decision's precedent
value is somewhat diminished, however, by the fact that there were two non-participat-
ing justices and three dissenters. Also, the holding, an affirmance of defendant's con-
viction for failing to answer questions of a legislative committee, could have rested
on other grounds. See discussion in King, supra note 5, at 251-57.
17. For discussion of the various factors which can make a search reasonable,
see Beaney, supra note 10, at 234-46.
18. See PROSSSR, TORTS § 112 (3d ed. 1964) ; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8,
at 215.
19. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
20. BALTO. CITY CODg art. 12, § 120 (1950).
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it must be weighed against other legitimate interests with which it
conflicts2
The privacy principle of the fourth amendment, although clear and
forthright standing alone, is only one half of a team. The fifth amend-
ment's privilege against self-incrimination is the other half,2" and,
when read together, even without any legal interpretations, these two
amendments demonstrate the founders' commitment to an adversary-
accusatorial system. Similarly to its fourth amendment stand, the
Court first held that the fifth amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination is not protected against state action by the fourteenth
amendment.2" But in Malloy v. Hogan4 the Court again reconsidered
its position, and changed its mind. Through Mr. Justice Brennan, the
Court held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
The fifth amendment has been the subject of much abuse and dis-
trust through the years. It is usually conceded that more guilty people
will fall back on the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause than
innocent ones. But not everyone who pleads the fifth amendment is
guilty. In a sense, the fifth amendment is the last bastion of the
individual against the state. It is the essence of an accusatorial system.
Its justification rests not on its contribution to a fair trial, but rather
on the sanctity and dignity to be afforded the privacy of the individual
man. In England, it is "largely a matter of atmosphere. '25  America
has made it a part of the Constitution.
What is today probably the least important of the constitutional
rights of privacy is that guaranteed in the third amendment's prohibi-
tion of quartering soldiers without the owner's consent - an insignifi-
cant freedom today, perhaps, but an indication of the overall intent of
the founding fathers.
The first amendment, on the other hand, has presented some
significant and rather unusual aspects of the privacy concept. For one
thing, the amendment protects the right of the people to peaceably
assemble. The Court has recognized in this right a freedom of asso-
ciation, which, to be meaningful, requires a correlative right to privacy
in the associational relationship.26 Despite the sweeping language in
21. See also Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960), where a divided
court upheld a search by a building inspector when there was no visible health hazard
and no complaint. For a discussion of the dangers inherent in searches by adminis-
trative officers, rather than policy, see Mr. Justice Douglas's dissent in Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1959).
22. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 661 (1961), for the view that the exclusionary rule is not dictated by the fourth
amendment per se, but by the fourth considered with the fifth. See also Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), for an example of the broad scope afforded the
fourth and fifth amendments when viewed together before Olnstead.
23. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961) ; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
24. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
25. Griswald, supra note 2, at 223.
26. See discussion in Robison, Protection of Associations From Compulsory
Disclosure of Membership, 58 COLUM. L. Rev. 614, 619-20 and n.22 (1958), that the
drafters actually intended only a right to meet for protest purposes, and not a freedom
of association. At any rate, the Court has now protected the distinct freedom of
association. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
141 (1951).
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Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek2" that there is no provision in the Con-
stitution conferring any right of privacy on people or corporations,2 S
in De Jonge v. Oregon29 the Court conferred a right of privacy on
associations which had a lawful purpose. Again, however, the right to
privacy in this area was qualified by the necessity of balancing it with
other interests. In New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman" the Court
upheld a registration and disclosure statute against the Ku Klux Klan.
The nature and purpose of the organization out-weighed any claims to
privacy its members may have had. On the other hand, the NAACP
has generally been successful in having disclosure statutes declared
inapplicable.3' The result is that the right to keep private the fact of
membership in an association depends on the goals of the organization,
as well as the extent and effect of government infringement.82
At the same time, the first amendment may limit, as well as
support, a right of privacy; free speech may actually conflict with the
privacy principle. In Kovacs v. Cooper 3 a statute prohibiting loud-
speakers from emitting "loud and raucous" noises was upheld. The
Court held that the right of free speech does not mean that one can
unduly infringe upon another's right of privacy and that the statute
protecting privacy was valid in that case. But, in Public Utilities
Comm'n of the District of Columbia v. Pollak, the Court upheld the
right of a private company to install loud-speakers providing "music as
you ride" in its buses and streetcars.34 The Court, while recognizing
a right to be free from noise, felt that in this instance that right was
outweighed by the interest of the public in general, which did not
seem to object to the music. 5 In weighing the factors in Breard v.
27. 259 U.S. 530 (1922).
28. The Court has reaffirmed the idea that corporations do not have constitu-
tional rights or privacy. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632
(1950).
29. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
30. 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
31. See Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961) ; Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See also Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), where the Court invalidated a state statute requiring
teachers to disclose all organizations to which they belonged.
32. The registration provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act, 64 Stat.
987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-97 (1958), have presented some troublesome problems
for the Supreme Court. In Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961), the Court held that the registration
provisions did not violate the first amendment and that the Party must register. But
in a case just recently decided, Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382
U.S. 70 (1965), the Court held that registration was inconsistent with the fifth
amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, since admission of membership in
the Party can be used for prosecution purposes under several federal criminal statutes.
This result may mean that the fifth amendment's right of privacy is to be weighed
more heavily in consideration against other interests than the first amendment's privacy
in associational relationship.
For general discussion of the right of privacy in associational relationships see
Rice, FRnDOM op ASSOCIATION (1962); Robison, supra note 26; Comment, 40
N.C.L. IRv. 788 (1962).
33. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
34. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
35. Compare Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), where the Court invali-
dated an ordinance which, without setting up guidelines, required permission from
the police chief in order to operate loud-speakers on a public street.
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Alexandria6 the Court concluded that the individual homeowner's
right to privacy outweighed a publisher's right to distribute publications
and upheld a Virginia statute prohibiting salesmen from going on
private property without the owner's consent.3
THE PRIVACY PRINCIPLE IN THE SUPREME COURT TODAY
In Barron v. Baltimore"8 the Court decided that the Bill of Rights
was not a limitation on the powers of the states. But since 1868 and the
enactment of the fourteenth amendment, the Court has been concerned
with which provisions in the Bill of Rights are in fact to be applied to
the states via the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. By what-
ever means the various justices have decided to utilize - absorption,
"ordered liberty", or a form of incorporation - the end result has been
that virtually all of the major rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights
have been applied to the states.3 9 The method of inclusion by which
the Bill of Rights is applied through the Fourteenth Amendment to the
states is quite relevant to the privacy idea. We have seen how the first,
third, fourth, and fifth amendments offer enough of their faces to
reflect facets of privacy protection. But privacy itself is not mentioned
in the Bill of Rights. What is mentioned instead are these rights
protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures, self-incrimina-
tion, and so on. Such liberties encompass a large segment of what we
regard as personal rights. But they do not encompass all. A most
difficult question of constitutional interpretation arises when there is a
clear, unwarranted invasion of privacy which is not expressly or
impliedly protected by a particular amendment. Such was the case in
Griswold v. Connecticut.40
A Connecticut statute forbade using any drug, medicinal article,
or instrument to prevent conception. The defendants were convicted as
accessories for giving advice to married couples as to means of pre-
venting conception. The defendants claimed a violation of the four-
teenth amendment. The problem with declaring the birth control
law void was that there did not appear to be a specific provision of the
Constitution which it violated. Surely, it was "an uncommonly silly
law", 4' a bad law, an invasion of privacy; but where was it prohibited in
the Constitution? Mr. Justice Douglas, delivering the plurality opinion,
found that the "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
36. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
37. Compare Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 341 (1943), where the free
speech interest was combined with the free exercise of religion. The Court found
unconstitutional, as applied to a Jehovah's Witness, an ordinance making it a crime
to summon people to their door to receive circulars.
38. 32 U.S. (Pet.) 242 (1833).
39. Some guarantees which have not in fact been incorporated by the Court and
which are unlikely to be applied to the states are: the third amendment's quartering
of soldiers clause, the seventh's right to jury trial in civil cases involving more than
twenty dollars, and the fifth's grand jury and double jeopardy guarantees.
40. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
41. Id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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and substance."'4 2 The present case lay within the "zone of privacy
created by several fundamental guarantees.' ' 4
Justices Harlan and White, in concurring opinions, found the
statute invalid not because of a Bill of Rights violation, but because it
violated the "ordered liberty"44 concept of the fourteenth amendment.
In essence, this view of the Constitution's due process clauses says:
due process protects rights which are fundamental. Marital privacy
is a fundamental right. Therefore, this right is protected against
federal infringement by the fifth amendment's due process clause, and
against state action by the fourteenth's."This interpretation seems to
have upheld at least one other unenunciated right of privacy in the
past - the secret ballot.45
Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion emphasized the lack of a
specific constitutional provision which could be pointed to. Believing
in a strict incorporation theory which includes no more and no less
than the first eight amendments,4" Mr. Justice Black expressed great
concern over the ability of the Court to read natural law theories into
the Constitution to invalidate legislation. Likewise, Mr. Justice Stewart
dissented on the ground that there is no express guarantee of privacy
in the Constitution.
Mr. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion suggested a more novel
approach to the problem. Mr. Justice Goldberg felt that the ninth amend-
ment, which says that the enumeration of certain rights should not be
construed to disparage other rights "retained by the people" manifests
the existence in the Constitution of fundamental rights not expressly
stated. Reciting the history of the amendment, Goldberg finds an intent
in the founders to recognize the inability of language to convey every
concept, and to emphasize that there are additional fundamental rights
existing alongside those specifically listed.47 The tenth amendment was
also cited as a back-up argument for the proposition that the Constitu-
tion protects rights not enumerated.
The result of the Griswold case has far-reaching implications. The
Court has recognized a certain type of privacy, marital privacy, which
is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution. In so doing, the Court
did not expand any specific guarantee, but instead looked to the spirit
behind the Bill of Rights and found zones of protected freedoms, into
which marital privacy fell. There is some reason to fear, along with
Justices Black and Stewart, the roads that may have been opened with
this decision. The main cause of concern is with the possibility of a
natural law technique permitting legislation to be voided at the whim
and caprice of the justices. Certainly, the dangers of this method in
42. Id. at 484.
43. Id. at 485.
44. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
45. See Nutting, Freedom of Silence: Constitutional Protection Against Govern-
mental Intrusions in Political Affairs, 47 MIcH. L. Riv. 181 (1948), for the history
of the evolution of the secret ballot into a constitutionally protected right of privacy
through the fourteenth amendment.
46. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting).
47. The Supreme Court has yet to rest a decision solely on the grounds of the
ninth amendment. See generally PATTERSON, THn FORGoTrgN NINTH AM4NDM4NT
(1955) ; Redlich, supra note 6.
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the area of economic legislation have been proven. 4' But when we leave
the area of economic regulation and turn instead to the realm of
individual liberties, the dangers of the natural law theories seem
lessened.
It does not bother us so much that the Court, with the Constitution
as a basic guide, will apply the standards when personal liberties are
infringed upon. In fact, it seems desirable; surely, it is one of the
Court's functions to protect rights. On the other hand, it seems equally
desirable for the Court to give economic legislation a wide scope. Many
factors coalesce in creating this distinction. For one thing, there is
the question of facilities. The Supreme Court simply is not as well-
equipped as Congress to deal with matters of economic policy, since
the Court, by the nature of the adversary system, deals only with data
brought to it.
But, more significantly, history has taught us that the subject
matter of economics does not lend itself readily to judicial determina-
tion. Economic policy is an area best determined by a body hyper-
sensitive to the majoritarian will. Flexibility and responsiveness play
crucial roles in enabling a changing society to grow economically.
However, personal rights should not depend on the will of the majority.
Personal freedom is an area which needs as its protector a body with
skin thick enough to withstand high degrees of public displeasure. The
judiciary, and especially the Supreme Court, fits this role. While the
Court is certainly not entirely unresponsive to the will of the people,
its independence from the voting process affords it the necessary
stability to protect personal freedoms particularly in the face of adverse
public opinion. Also, the Constitution itself makes the protection of
personal freedom an easier task for the judiciary than promulgating
economic policy. The personal liberties stand on a somewhat clearer
textual footing than the nebulous power over interstate commerce: they
are a little more specialized and there are more of them from which to
gauge the spirit of their meaning. Thus, the constitutional text, the
judicial method, and the degree of responsiveness to the people, all
combine to make the Supreme Court the protector of individual free-
dom, but not the promulgator of economic policy.
To make such a distinction in the Court's function requires a view
of the Constitution as a flexible document which intimates as well as
expresses and acts more as an outline than the last word. We are
saying, in effect, that as a matter of policy the Court should enter this
area but not that one. The reasons for the Court's involvement in one
sphere and not another can be based on the Court's ability to deal with
the problems and the nature of the problems themselves. But there is
another factor to consider: when our system of government was created,
was the Supreme Court meant to be given this discretion? And, in
resolving this issue, we must simultaneously resolve another: to what
extent must we, in the second half of the twentieth century, depend and
manipulate our system on the basis of the ideas of those who lived
48. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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in the eighteenth century, or even in the 1860s? These are questions
without answers, but questions which must constantly be asked.
As Mr. Justice Black points out in his Griswold dissent, the Con-
stitution contains its own method for change - the amending process.
Consequently, Mr. Justice Black sees the Constitution as a collection
of words from the past in which it is the Court's function to determine
the meanings of the drafters; it is not the Court's function to legislate.
But in many ways the skeletal terms of the Constitution will unavoid-
ably cast the Court into the role of quasi-legislature. The amending
process is too unwieldy to constantly fall back on when change is
needed. Nor would we want frequent amendments. If we could
change the Constitution easily it would lose its stability and become
self-destroying. The more we must renovate, the less firm becomes the
superstructure. It is judicial legislation which prevents this. The
judiciary and legislature are not mutually exclusive, nor can they be.
Both are aspects of the political system; and "a 'constitution' is a matter
of purest politics, a structure of power."4 9 The line between the Court
and the Congress can only be approximately drawn. Thus, it is point-
less to lay down a blanket rule that the Supreme Court should not
legislate at all: the issue is, to what extent and in what areas should
the Court make legislative policy decisions? In the area of personal
rights, it seems that the Court should indeed be the legislator.
The Court's "penumbra" technique in Griswold permits just such
a process, as does Goldberg's ninth amendment technique. Both tech-
niques agree that there is a right to marital privacy which should be
protected even though the right is not mentioned in the Constitution.
And the method for determining what rights are there but not men-
tioned is the same by both techniques: look to those rights which are
mentioned and search out the underlying principles. Also, Mr. Justice
Harlan's view of due process presents the same result. But Harlan's
view, by failing to incorporate the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth
amendment, suffers from the lack of any textual standard. This method
makes each judge bound only by his own notions of reasonableness
and fairness - notions nurtured by training in the legal method, to be
sure, but still lacking any written guide from which to draw sustenance.
THE LIBERTY WE DESERVE
We have seen then that there are many constitutional rights of
privacy and many facets to each right. The fourth amendment is our
most vivid example. On its face the fourth amendment probihits un-
reasonable searches and seizures. This may range from stomach-
pumping5" to spike microphones.5 ' But, this may not include wire-
tapping 52 or other non-physical trespassing eavesdropping devices.5
But when we look beyond the literal language of the fourth amendment
49. BLACK, PERSPICTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1963).
50. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
51. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
52. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
53. See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
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and try to determine the principle behind the words, there does not
seem to be a justification for the distinctions the cases have drawn.
What the words are protecting is privacy, not merely physical trespass.
Judge Frank, in his dissenting opinion in United States v. On Lee,54
captured the essence of the principle:
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his
house; he can retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the knowl-
edge that they cannot get at him without disobeying the con-
stitution. That is still a sizable hunk of liberty - worth protecting
from encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized society must provide
some such oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated
enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man's
castle.
In addition to the fourth amendment, we have seen that the first,
third, and fifth amendments all have zones of privacy within their
scope. And, we have seen the arguments made that the ninth and four-
teenth amendments manifest a constitutional recognition of privacy
since such a right is fundamental. Few would disagree that privacy, to
at least some degree, is a desirable element in society. As modem
technology improves the methods for invading our privacy," as we
march closer toward Orwellian regimentation and transparency, our
awareness of a need to protect certain aspects of individual selfhood
becomes more acute. But we can not merely say: "It is a desirable
thing to protect; therefore, the Supreme Court can protect it." "[W]e
must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding. ' 56
But this Constitution has been an amazingly durable document.
Over the years, it has adapted itself, though judicial construction
as well as amendments, to the vital needs of the people. The bulkiness
of the amending procedure has necessitated flexible interpretations to
accommodate the document to a changing society. The result has been
the functioning of the Supreme Court as a maker of policy as well as
interpreter of words. And, in this role, the Court can find within this
constitution the underlying principles to meet the ever-growing attack
on privacy. As Mr. Justice McKenna said in Weems v. United States:
Times works changes, brings into existence new conditions
and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is
peculiarly true of constitutions .... In the application of a con-
stitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has
been but of what may be."
54. 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1951).
55. Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
474 (1928), prognosticated the onslaught of the scientific eavesdropping advances:
"Ways may someday be developed by which the Government, without removing papers
from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled
to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home." To determine just
how close we have come to this development see DASH, SCHWARTZ & KNOWLTON, Tia
EAVESDROPPERS (1959).
56. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819).
57. 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
[VOL. XXVI
LEHMAN V. SPENCER LADD'S, INC.
The changes time has worked since 1791 in the means for invading
human privacy have truly been phenomenal. We worry now not so
much about the State coming in and seizing our personal possessions,
as we do about the State overhearing our every word and overseeing
our marital relationships. The privacy principle existed in 1791, but
was not viable, or perhaps not as needed. Today it is. Consequently,
the Court has given the principle a "wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth." Regardless of the theory used, there is little
doubt that in the cases to come, that "sizable hunk of liberty" which
is the right of privacy will find protection in the Constitution. Whether
by specific guarantee, "ordered liberty", or "penumbra", the weapons
for combating the invasion are there. Surely, a generation which has
manifested such enormous scientific and sociological advances deserves
at least this much liberty.
Evidence Of Financial Worth And Apportionment
Of Exemplary Damages
Lehman v. Spencer Ladd's, Inc.'
Plaintiff brought an action against two joint tort-feasors, alleging
wrongful eviction from its place of business and conversion of its
property. By its complaint, plaintiff sought both compensatory and
exemplary damages.2 During the trial, the court permitted plaintiff,
without objection by the defendants, to introduce evidence of the finan-
cial worth of each defendant in support of its claim for exemplary
damages. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, against both defen-
dants, and rendered a joint and several verdict in the amount of
$11,952.00 compensatory damages, and $17,500.00 exemplary damages.
Upon defendants' motion for a new trial, the trial court alternatively
ordered plaintiff to file a remittitur of that portion of the verdict which
assessed exemplary damages or suffer a new trial. Plaintiff refused to
file the remittitur and appealed the trial court's order to the First
District Court of Appeal,' which reversed the remittitur order, holding
that evidence of the financial worth of one or more joint defendants
was admissible as bearing upon the issue of exemplary damages in an
action against joint tort-feasors wherein both compensatory and exem-
plary damages were alleged.
1. 182 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1965).
2. Damages which have been awarded over-and-above compensatory damages
have been labeled "smart-money," "punitive" damages, "vindictive" damages, and
"exemplary" damages; they will be referred to as exemplary damages throughout
this note.
3. Spencer Ladd's, Inc. v. Lehman, 167 So. 2d 731 (Fla. App. 1964) ; 19 ARK.
L. Rxv. 189 (1965).
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